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A Unilateral Accident Model under Ambiguity
Joshua C. Teitelbaum

ABSTRACT

Standard accident models are based on the expected utility framework and represent agents’
beliefs about accident risk with a probability distribution. Consequently, they do not allow
for Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity, with respect to accident risk and cannot accommodate
optimism (ambiguity loving) or pessimism (ambiguity aversion). This paper presents a unilateral accident model under ambiguity. To incorporate ambiguity, I adopt the Choquet expected utility framework and represent the injurer’s beliefs with a neoadditive capacity. I
show that neither strict liability nor negligence is generally efﬁcient in the presence of
ambiguity. In addition, I generally ﬁnd that the injurer’s level of care decreases (increases)
with ambiguity if he is optimistic (pessimistic) and decreases (increases) with his degree of
optimism (pessimism). The results suggest that negligence is more robust to ambiguity and,
therefore, may be superior to strict liability in unilateral accident cases. Finally, I design an
efﬁcient ambiguity-adjusted liability rule.

1. INTRODUCTION

Fathered by Coase (1960), the economic analysis of tort law lies at the
foundation of modern law and economics. The workhorse of tort law
and economics is the basic accident model, which was ﬁrst formalized
in Brown (1973) and later expounded in Shavell (1987) and Landes and
Posner (1987).1 The basic accident model provides a framework for
JOSHUA C . TEITELBAUM is Visiting Assistant Professor at Cornell Law School and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Economics at Cornell University. This paper is based
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1. A more recent comprehensive treatment of the basic accident model is contained in
Miceli (1997).
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analyzing the effects of liability rules on agents’ incentives to take care
against accidents and, therefore, on the social costs of accidents. Consequently, it has been widely used to examine positive and normative
questions about the efﬁciency and suitability of alternative liability
rules.2
Standard formulations of the basic accident model assume that agents
are expected utility maximizers in conformity with the decision theories
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), or Anscombe
and Aumann (1963). Under expected utility theory,3 agents are assumed
to make decisions under uncertainty as if they assign a probability distribution over the set of possible events and choose an act from the set
of available acts that maximizes the expected value of a utility function
with respect to such probability distribution. Because of its mathematical
simplicity and normative appeal, as well as the explanatory power of
many of its predictions, expected utility theory is the dominant framework for the analysis of individual decision making under uncertainty
in economics.
Notwithstanding its primacy, there have been many challenges to
expected utility theory as a positive decision theory. One of the most
famous is the paradox of Ellsberg (1961). One version of the Ellsberg
paradox goes as follows. There are two urns. Urn 1 contains 50 red
balls and 50 black balls. Urn 2 contains 100 red and black balls in an
unknown proportion. Subjects engage in two gambles. In gamble A,
subjects receive $100 if they draw a red ball and nothing if they draw
a black ball. In gamble B, subjects receive $100 if they draw a black
ball and nothing if they draw a red ball. Before each gamble, subjects
choose the urn from which they prefer to draw the ball. Most subjects
in this situation choose to draw from urn 1 in both gambles (see Becker
and Brownson 1964). This result, however, is paradoxical to expected
utility theory, for it would imply that the assigned probability of drawing
a red ball from urn 2 is less than one-half in gamble A and greater than
one-half in gamble B. In other words, these subjects are not acting as if
they assigned probabilities to uncertain events, and therefore expected
utility theory cannot explain their choices.
The Ellsberg paradox highlights the signiﬁcance of ambiguity for
2. I adhere to the view that efﬁciency is the appropriate normative goal of the legal
system. In defense of this view, see Kaplow and Shavell (2001, 2002b).
3. I use the term “expected utility theory” broadly to encompass objective expected
utility theory as formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as well as subjective
expected utility theory as formulated by Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
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individual decision making. Knight (1921) made a distinction between
risk—uncertain events with speciﬁed probabilities—and uncertainty—
uncertain events with unspeciﬁed or ambiguous probabilities. The approach of expected utility theory, however, obviates this distinction. As
a result, models based on the expected utility framework, including the
basic accident model, do not allow for Knightian uncertainty, which has
come to be known in the literature as ambiguity, and therefore cannot
capture different attitudes toward or reactions to ambiguity, including
ambiguity loving, or optimism, and ambiguity aversion, or pessimism.
Psychology research suggests that people exhibit optimism and pessimism in the accident context. Optimism has been found to be robust
with respect to a variety of accident risks (see, for example, Weinstein
1980, 1989, 1999; Sunstein 1997; Jolls 1998). In the case of trafﬁc
accidents, for example, studies have found that while people’s beliefs
about societal accident risks are fairly accurate (see, for example, Lichtenstein et al. 1978), people generally are optimistic with respect to the
likelihood that they will cause or otherwise be involved in an accident
(see Svenson 1981; Svenson, Frischhoff, and MacGregor 1985; Finn and
Bragg 1986; Matthews and Moran 1986; DeJoy 1989; McKenna, Stanier, and Lewis 1991; Guppy 1992). Pessimism tends to be displayed with
respect to the risk of accidents that are “available”—for example, highly
salient, perhaps owing to media attention; dramatic or catastrophic in
nature; intrinsically vivid, imaginable, or memorable; or technological
in nature (see Sunstein 1997; Jolls 1998; Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998;
Gigerenzer 2005; see also Slovic, Frischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982; Covello and Johnson 1987; Viscusi and Magat 1987; Viscusi 1992). This
research calls for the modiﬁcation of the basic accident model to allow
for ambiguity.
The Ellsberg paradox and subsequent experimental evidence of the
importance of attitudes toward ambiguity for decisions4 have inspired
various alternatives to and generalizations of expected utility theory to
accommodate ambiguity.5 One of the most inﬂuential axiomatic generalizations of expected utility theory that accommodates ambiguity is
Choquet expected utility theory, which was pioneered by Schmeidler
4. For a more detailed discussion of the Ellsberg paradox and a survey of the related
experimental evidence, see Camerer (1995).
5. For a survey of alternatives to and generalizations of expected utility theory, including those that accomodate ambiguity, see Camerer and Weber (1992).
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(1989).6 Under Choquet expected utility theory, agents’ beliefs about the
likelihood of uncertain events are represented with a nonadditive probability called a capacity.7 Agents are assumed to act so as to maximize
the expected value of a utility function with respect to such capacity,
which is calculated using the Choquet (1954) integral. The nonadditivity
of the capacity allows for different attitudes toward ambiguity. In particular, a concave (superadditive) capacity reﬂects optimism, while a
convex (subadditive) capacity reﬂects pessimism (see Schmeidler 1989;
Wakker 2001).8 Choquet expected utility with a convex capacity, for
instance, can capture pessimism as exempliﬁed by the Ellsberg paradox.9
This paper presents a unilateral accident model under ambiguity.10
Speciﬁcally, it generalizes the basic unilateral accident model to allow
for ambiguity by assuming the injurer is a Choquet expected utility
maximizer and representing the injurer’s beliefs about accident risk with
a special type of capacity called a neoadditive capacity, which was introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (forthcoming). Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive capacity is the simplest generalization of expected utility that can accommodate optimistic and
pessimistic reactions to ambiguity. It assumes that an agent makes decisions under uncertainty as if he11 believes, with incomplete conﬁdence,
that a speciﬁed probability distribution describes the likelihood of uncertain events and chooses an act from the set of available acts that
maximizes a weighted sum of the minimum utility, the maximum utility,
6. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) axiomatize Choquet expected utility in the
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and Savage (1954) frameworks, respectively. An additional
axiomatization of Choquet expected utility is provided by Sarin and Wakker (1992).
7. Expected utility is a special case of Choquet expected utility in which the capacity
is additive (that is, a probability). A capacity m is additive if m(E) ⫹ m(F) p m(E ∪ F) for
all mutually exclusive events E and F.
8. A capacity m is convex if m(E) ⫹ m(F) ≤ m(E ∪ F) for all mutually exclusive events E
and F. It is concave if the reverse inequality holds.
9. A predecessor to Choquet expected utility theory is Shackle’s (1949, 1955, 1961)
nonprobabilistic theory of individual decision making under uncertainty. Although
Shackle’s theory was widely discussed in the 1950s and still constitutes a main reference
point for economists working in the Keynesian and Austrian traditions, it largely has been
disregarded by neoclassical economists and modern decision theorists (Basili and Zappia
2003a, 2003b). For a thorough discussion of Schakle’s theory, including its critics in the
1950s, its relation to Choquet expected utility theory, and its place in the Keynesian and
Austrian traditions, see Basili and Zappia (2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2006) and Zappia and
Basili (2005).
10. In unilateral accidents, the injurer, but not the victim, can take care to reduce
expected accident losses.
11. For simplicity, this paper uses masculine pronouns throughout.
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and the expected utility with respect to such probability distribution.
The parameters of the model allow me to measure the injurer’s degree
of ambiguity, which is the complement of his degree of conﬁdence, and
his degrees of optimism and pessimism, which determine the weights
assigned to the maximum utility and the minimum utility. As a result,
I can perform comparative statics on changes in optimism, pessimism,
and ambiguity.12
I show that in the basic unilateral accident setting neither strict liability nor negligence is generally efﬁcient in the presence of ambiguity.
In particular, I show that (1) in the case of ﬁxed accident losses (when
the injurer’s level of care does not affect the magnitude of accident
losses), the injurer will exercise too little care under strict liability and
may exercise too little care under negligence, and (2) in the case of
variable accident losses (when the injurer’s level of care does affect the
magnitude of accident losses), the injurer may exercise too little or too
much care under strict liability and may exercise too little care under
negligence. In addition, I ﬁnd that, in general, the injurer’s level of care
(1) decreases with his degree of optimism and increases with his degree
of pessimism and (2) decreases with ambiguity if he is optimistic and
increases with ambiguity if he is pessimistic. The results are in contrast
to the standard results of the basic unilateral accident model: namely,
in both cases on accident losses, the injurer will take optimal care under
strict liability and negligence. The results suggest that negligence is more
robust to ambiguity and, therefore, may be superior to strict liability in
unilateral accident cases. Finally, I design and demonstrate the efﬁciency
of an ambiguity-adjusted liability rule.
This paper contributes to strands of the law and economics and the
applied decision theory literatures. Within the law and economics literature, this paper is the ﬁrst to adopt the Choquet expected utility
framework to incorporate ambiguity with respect to accident risk into
the basic accident model.13 As such, it contributes to the well-established
12. Closely related to Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive capacity is a-maxmin
expected utility with multiple priors (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci 2004). Under
this approach, ambiguity is represented by a set of probability distributions, and optimism
and pessimism correspond to the weights applied to the maximum and minimum expected
utility over the set of probability distributions.
13. There are many papers that study the effects of uncertainty with respect to other
aspects of the basic accident model (see footnotes 22–23). Shavell (1992) considers a
situation in which agents face uncertainty about accident risk, but he examines the incentives that alternative liability rules create for injurers to obtain information about accident
risk and whether these incentives are socially optimal. There are a limited number of papers
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literature on the economics of tort law (for surveys, see Bouckaert and
De Geest 2000, pt. 3; Kaplow and Shavell 2002a, pp. 1667–82; Mattiacci
and Parisi 2005) and to the burgeoning behavioral law and economics
literature.14 Within the applied decision theory literature, this paper adds
to the growing number of applications of Choquet expected utility theory
to accommodate ambiguity (for a survey, see Mukerji and Tallon 2004),
including applications that use neoadditive capacities to represent beliefs
(see, for example, Schipper 2005; Eichberger and Kelsey 2006; Ford,
Kelsey, and Pang 2006; Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper 2007; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant, forthcoming).
Most closely related to this paper are Posner (2003), Eide (2005,
2007), and Bigus (2006). Posner (2003) introduces optimism about lowprobability accidents into the basic unilateral accident model by assuming agents know the probability of an accident when it is above some
threshold but treat accident probabilities below the threshold as though
they were zero. For the case of ﬁxed accident losses, he ﬁnds that, under
both strict liability and negligence, agents might take too much or too
little care for sufﬁciently high levels of optimism and will take optimal
care for sufﬁciently low levels of optimism. Posner also analyzes the case
of variable activity levels and brieﬂy discusses bilateral accidents, neither
of which I address in this paper. However, he does not consider the case
of unilateral accidents with variable accident losses, which I do. Eide
(2005, 2007) and Bigus (2006) analyze the basic accident model under
rank-dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin 1982, 1993) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), respectively.15 For the case
of unilateral accidents, Eide ﬁnds that under strict liability the injurer
may take too much or too little care depending on the slope of the
probability weighting function and that under negligence the injurer may
take too little care if he substantially underweights the probability of an
that consider the effects of ambiguity on the economic analysis of other areas of law, for
example, taxation (Jolls 1998; Chorvat 2002) and the criminal process (Segal and Stein
2006).
14. Sunstein (1997) and Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) were early calls for the
modiﬁcation of standard law and economics models to reﬂect advances in behavioral economics and decision theory. Sunstein (2000) and Parisi and Smith (2005) are recent collections of behavioral law and economics papers.
15. Rank-dependent expected utility theory is a special case of Choquet expected utility
theory in which the agent’s capacity is an increasing probability weighting function (see
Wakker 1990; Hong and Wakker 1996). Prospect theory is an alternative decision theory
that is not directly related to Choquet expected utility theory. However, cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) is a generalization of Choquet expected utility theory
that permits different treatment of gains and losses (see Tversky and Wakker 1995).
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accident. Bigus ﬁnds that the injurer will take too little care under strict
liability and may take too little care under negligence depending on the
slope of the probability weighting function. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the results of this paper. Eide and Bigus also study bilateral accidents
and vague standards of due care, respectively. Neither paper, however,
distinguishes the cases of ﬁxed and variable accident losses or performs
comparative statics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. It describes the basic setup and explains how ambiguity about
accident risk is modeled by Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive
capacity. Section 3 states the results of the model in the absence of
ambiguity, which correspond to the standard results of the basic unilateral accident model, and derives the results of the model in the presence of ambiguity. Section 4 develops a simple numerical example to
illustrate the model’s results. Section 5 discusses certain implications of
the model and designs an ambiguity-adjusted liability rule that is efﬁcient
in the presence of ambiguity. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests
directions for future research. Appendix A contains a formal description
of the Choquet expected utility framework for the paper. Appendix B
presents the proofs of an assertion and several propositions stated but
not proved in the body of the paper.

2. THE MODEL

2.1. Basic Setup

The model is based on the basic unilateral accident model of Shavell
(1987). There are two agents—an injurer and a victim—and a numeraire
good—income—in terms of which all payoffs and costs are deﬁned. Both
agents are risk neutral, and their Bernoulli utility of income is equal to
income. The agents are strangers and not parties to any contract or
market transaction, and transaction costs are sufﬁciently high to preclude
Coasean bargaining.
Each agent engages in a risky activity from which he receives a payoff.
For example, the injurer could be driving a car, and the victim could be
a pedestrian. Let k 1 0 denote the payoff to the injurer from engaging
in his activity, and normalize the victim’s payoff to be zero. The injurer,
but not the victim, has the ability to choose a level of care, expressed
in terms of its cost, to exercise when engaging in his activity. Let c ≥ 0
denote the level of care exercised by the injurer. An accident involving

438 / T H E J O U R N A L O F L E G A L S T U D I E S / V O L U M E 3 6 ( 2 ) / J U N E 2 0 0 7

the injurer and the victim occurs with probability p 苸 (0, 1] . In the event
of an accident, the victim incurs accident losses l 1 0 . Hence, expected
accident losses are L p pl.
I consider two cases of accident losses: ﬁxed accident losses and variable accident losses. In the case of ﬁxed accident losses, the injurer can
take care to reduce the probability of an accident, but the magnitude of
accident losses is ﬁxed. Thus, expected accident losses are L(c) p p(c)l.
In the case of variable accident losses, the injurer can take care to reduce
the probability of an accident and the magnitude of accident losses, and
therefore expected accident losses are L(c) p p(c)l(c) . In both cases, I
assume that p(c) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing,
and strictly convex—p (c) ! 0 and p (c) 1 0. In the case of variable accident losses, I further assume that l(c) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing, and strictly convex—l (c) ! 0 and l (c) 1 0.
Whether the victim receives compensation from the injurer for accident losses depends on the applicable liability rule. I consider three
liabilities rules: (1) no liability, under which the victim receives no compensation from the injurer, regardless of the level of care exercised by
the injurer, (2) strict liability, under which the victim receives full compensation for his accident losses from the injurer, regardless of the injurer’s level of care, and (3) negligence, under which the victim receives
full compensation for his accident losses if the injurer fails to meet the
applicable standard of due care, denoted c̄ . In modern Anglo-American
law, negligence is the general basis for liability in cases of accidents
among noncontracting parties or strangers. Strict liability applies only
in certain accident cases, including cases in which the injurer engages in
an abnormally dangerous activity or manufactures a defective product,
certain nuisance and trespass cases, and cases involving certain environmental harms (see Dobbs 2001).
2.2. Modeling Ambiguity

In a departure from the basic unilateral accident model, I assume the
injurer faces ambiguity with respect to accident risk. To incorporate
ambiguity into the model, I assume the injurer is a Choquet expected
utility maximizer whose beliefs about accident risk may be represented
with a neoadditive capacity n based on p.16 For simplicity, I assume the
victim is an expected utility maximizer.
16. More precisely, n is based on the probability distribution {p, 1 ⫺ p}. To simplify the
notation, however, I occassionally let p stand for the probability distribution {p, 1 ⫺ p}.

ACCIDENT MODEL UNDER AMBIGUITY /

439

Formally, I assume the injurer’s belief about the likelihood of an
accident is given by n(p) p d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c) , where d, a 苸 [0, 1],
and I normalize n(0) p 0 and n(1) p 1. Similarly, the injurer’s belief
about the likelihood of no accident is given by n(1 ⫺ p) p d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹
(1 ⫺ d) [1 ⫺ p(c)]. Note that, in general, the injurer’s beliefs are nonadditive: n(p) ⫹ n(1 ⫺ p) ( 1 unless d p 0 or a p 12 . Given his beliefs, the
injurer’s Choquet expected utility of exercising level of care c under a
rule of no liability or strict liability is
Vp(c) p dam(c) ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a)M(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)Ep(c),

(1)

where m(c), M(c), and Ep(c) denote the minimum utility, the maximum
utility, and the expected utility with respect to p, respectively, of exercising level of care c given the applicable liability rule. Under a negligence
rule, the injurer effectively faces no liability if he satisﬁes the standard
of due care (c ≥ c¯ ) and faces strict liability otherwise (c ! c¯ ). Thus, the
injurer’s Choquet expected utility of exercising level of care c under a
negligence rule is17
no liability
{VV (c)(c) under
under strict liability
p

p

if c ≥ c¯
¯
if c ! c.

Note that because there are only two possible events—accident or no
accident—and given the basic setup of the model, under each liability
rule the minimum utility m(c) is the outcome in the event of an accident,
the maximum utility M(c) is the outcome in the event of no accident,
and the expected utility Ep(c) is the expected outcome p(c)m(c) ⫹ [1 ⫺
p(c)] M(c). Accordingly, equation (1) can be rewritten as
Vp(c) p [da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c)]m(c) ⫹ {d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)[1 ⫺ p(c)]}M(c).

(2)

From equation (2) we can see that in evaluating the Choquet expected
utility of exercising level of care c, the injurer assigns weight da ⫹
(1 ⫺ d)p(c) to the accident outcome, m(c) , and weight d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺
d) [1 ⫺ p(c)] to the no-accident outcome, M(c) . It is important to note
that these weights are not subjective probabilities corresponding to the
injurer’s beliefs about accident risk but rather are decision weights generated by a neoadditive capacity based on p that represents his nonadditive beliefs.18 In particular, the weight assigned to the accident out17. Technical details underlying n and Vp are supplied in Appendix A.
18. For a detailed discussion of capacities and decision weights, see Sarin and Wakker
(1998).
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come, da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c), does not correspond to the injurer’s belief about
the likelihood of an accident, n(p).19
Intuitively, representing the injurer’s beliefs about accident risk with
a neoadditive capacity based on p assumes the injurer believes the probability of an accident is p but lacks conﬁdence in this belief. The injurer’s
degree of conﬁdence is measured by (1 ⫺ d) . It is the weight the injurer
puts on p in his capacity and on Ep in his utility function. The degree
of ambiguity is measured by d. It represents the degree to which the
injurer lacks conﬁdence in p. The injurer reacts to ambiguity by overweighting either the outcome in the event of an accident, m, or the
outcome in the event of no accident, M. If the injurer overweights the
accident outcome, he is pessimistic. If he overweights the no-accident
outcome, he is optimistic. Which outcome the injurer overweights depends on the parameter a. If a 1 p , the injurer overweights the accident
outcome; if a ! p, the injurer overweights the no-accident outcome.20
Accordingly, I interpret a as the injurer’s degree of pessimism and 1 ⫺
a as his degree of optimism. Note that if there is no ambiguity (d p 0)
or if the injurer is neither optimistic nor pessimistic (a p p ), then Choquet expected utility with respect to n based on p reduces to expected
utility with respect to p (that is, Vp p Ep ), and the model reduces to the
standard unilateral accident model.21
In order to focus on the effects of ambiguity on the standard results
of the basic unilateral accident model, I assume there is no uncertainty
with respect to any other aspect of the model.22 For example, I assume
that the agents know the applicable legal standards and that the court
accurately determines all relevant facts, including the probability of an
19. In fact, they coincide only if there is no ambiguity (d p 0 ), the injurer is neither
optimistic nor pessimistic (a p p ), or the injurer reacts to ambiguity with equal degrees
1
of optimism and pessimism (a p 2 ). Note, however, that the weight assigned to the noaccident outcome, d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d) [1 ⫺ p(c)] , does correspond to the injurer’s belief
about the likelihood of no accident, n(1 ⫺ p) , and that da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c) p 1 ⫺ n(1 ⫺ p).
The former reﬂects a general property of Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive
capacity, namely, that the weight assigned to the best outcome corresponds to the agent’s
capacity of the best outcome (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2006). The latter reﬂects the
peculiar fact of the model that there are only two outcomes. It does not hold in the general
case in which there are more than two outcomes (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2006).
20. To see this, note that da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p 1 p if and only if a 1 p and that d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹
(1 ⫺ d)(1 ⫺ p) 1 1 ⫺ p if and only if a ! p.
21. To see that Vp(c) p Ep(c) if there is no ambiguity, simply substitute d p 0 into
equation (1). To see that Vp(c) p Ep(c) if the injurer is neither optimistic nor pessimistic,
substitute a p p into equation (2) and recall that Ep(c) p p(c)m(c) ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)] M(c).
22. Shavell (1987) and Miceli (1997) provide textbook coverage of various models
that introduce uncertainty with respect to other aspects of the basic accident model.
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accident, the magnitude and incidence of accident losses, and the agents’
preferences and acts.23 In addition, I abstract from other complexities
that have been introduced in the literature, such as bilateral care, variable
activity levels, bilateral harm, risk aversion, and the judgment-proof
problem.24
2.3. Remarks

Before turning to the results of the model, I conclude this section with
a few general remarks regarding Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive capacity.
2.3.1. Capacities and Ambiguity. A capacity can capture different ambiguity attitudes because it is nonadditive. To illustrate, I will show how
a convex neoadditive capacity can capture ambiguity aversion, or pessimism, as exempliﬁed by a preference for urn 1 (the unambiguous urn)
in both gambles in the Ellsberg paradox. Let u(x) denote the utility of
prize x and normalize u(0) p 0 . Consider an agent who evaluates gambles according to expected utility and whose belief about the likelihood
of drawing a red ball from urn 2 (the ambiguous urn) is given by a
probability p. A preference for urn 1 in gamble A implies 12 u(100) ⫹
1
u(0) 1 pu(100) ⫹ (1 ⫺ p)u(0), or 12 1 p, and a preference for urn 1 in
2
gamble B implies 12 u(0) ⫹ 12 u(100) 1 pu(0) ⫹ (1 ⫺ p)u(100) , or 12 1 1 ⫺ p.
Combining these conditions gives p ⫹ (1 ⫺ p) ! 1 , which contradicts the
additivity of p. This illustrates the paradox. It also illustrates that ambiguity aversion is akin to subadditivity. Next consider an agent who
evaluates gambles according to Choquet expected utility and whose belief about the likelihood of a drawing a red ball from urn 2 is given by
a convex neoadditive capacity m based on p. In addition, assume the
23. Craswell and Calfee (1986) present an accident model in which defendants face
uncertainty about the applicable legal standards. Shavell (1985) presents an accident model
in which courts face uncertainty about causation. Hylton (1990) presents an accident model
in which courts are unable to determine accurately in every case whether the defendant
acted negligently.
24. I restrict attention to unilateral care because it is the primitive form of the basic
accident model. In conformity with the basic accident model, I assume that the agents’
activity levels are ﬁxed and do not affect expected accident losses, that only the victim
incurs accident losses, and that the agents are risk neutral. Shavell (1980) introduces the
issue of the choice of activity level to the basic accident model. Leong (1989) and Arlen
(1990, 1992) present models in which both the injurer and the victim incur accident losses.
Shavell (1982) introduces risk aversion into the basic unilateral accident model. Shavell
(1986) examines the judgment-proof problem. For additional complexities that have been
introduced in the literature, see generally Shavell (1987) and Miceli (1997).
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agent faces ambiguity (d 1 0). Now a preference for urn 1 in gamble A implies 12 u(100) ⫹ 12 u(0) 1 [da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)(1 ⫺ p)]u(0) ⫹ [d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹
(1 ⫺ d)p]u(100), or 12 1 d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p p m(p), and a preference for urn
1 in gamble B implies 12 u(0) ⫹ 12 u(100) 1 [da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p]u(0) ⫹ [d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹
(1 ⫺ d)(1 ⫺ p)]u(100), or 12 1 d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)(1 ⫺ p) p m(1 ⫺ p). Combining these conditions gives m(p) ⫹ m(1 ⫺ p) ! 1 , which is consistent with the
convexity of m.
A neoadditive capacity is a probability
weighting function. In particular, it is a simple version of the familiar
inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Empirical studies indicate
that individuals tend to overweight low probabilities and underweight
high probabilities, with the most pronounced misweighting near the
extremes of the probability scale (see Gonzalez and Wu 1999). This
systematic distortion of probabilities implies an inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function. There is overwhelming evidence from parametric and nonparametric studies for the inverse-S shape (see Wakker
2001). A standard nonlinear speciﬁcation of an inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function is depicted in Figure 1 (dashed curve). A
neoadditive capacity, also depicted in Figure 1 (solid line), is a simple
linear speciﬁcation.
Under Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive capacity, an
agent’s preferences are represented by a weighted sum of the minimum
utility, the maximum utility, and the expected utility. There is experimental evidence that preferences have this form. Lopes (1987) proposes
a theory for risky choice that integrates two factors: a dispositional
tendency to seek either security or potential and a situational aspiration
level. Under Lopes’s theory, the security/potential factor reﬂects how a
person weights the worst and best outcomes, while the aspiration level
reﬂects an assessment of what outcome is reasonable to expect under
the circumstances. On the basis of her theory, Lopes makes predictions
about preferences over lotteries. She then presents experimental evidence
consistent with her predictions.
2.3.2. Neoadditive Capacities.

An advantage of representing beliefs with a neoadditive capacity is that it allows me to deﬁne
concrete notions of ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism. Ambiguity corresponds to an agent’s lack of conﬁdence in his belief about the probability of uncertain events. Optimism and pessimism are deﬁned according to the weights applied to extreme outcomes. Optimism means
2.3.3. Ambiguity, Optimism, and Pessimism.
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Figure 1. Neoadditive capacity as a linear inverse-S-shaped probability weighting function

the weight applied to the best outcome exceeds the probability of the
best outcome, and pessimism means the weight applied to the worst
outcome exceeds the probability of the worst outcome.25
The use of the terms “optimism” and “pessimism” in the present
framework is consistent with their use within an expected utility framework, in which optimism means the agent’s subjective probability of a
favorable (unfavorable) outcome is greater (less) than the objective probability of that outcome and pessimism means the agent’s subjective probability of a favorable (unfavorable) outcome is less (greater) than the
objective probability of that outcome (see, for example, Posner 2003;
Bar-Gill 2006). In both frameworks, optimism and pessimism correspond to “incorrect” decision weights resulting from misweighted or
misperceived probabilities. The key distinction lies in their interpretation. In the present framework, optimism and pessimism properly may
25. In general, the agent may overweight both the best and worst outcomes and underweight nonextreme outcomes. In the present model, however, in which there are only
two outcomes, the injurer overweights either the accident outcome or the no-accident
outcome but not both. A disadvantage of a neoadditive capacity is that it allows only the
best and worst outcomes to be overweighted. A more general type of capacity, called a JP
capacity, allows a number of good and bad outcomes to be overweighted (see Eichberger
and Kelsey 2006). However, when there are only two outcomes, as in the present model,
a JP capacity is isomorphic to a neoadditive capacity.
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be interpreted as attitudes toward or reactions to ambiguity. Speciﬁcally,
optimism corresponds to a concave (superadditive) capacity that reﬂects
ambiguity loving, while pessimism corresponds to a convex (subadditive)
capacity that reﬂects ambiguity aversion (see Schmeidler 1989; Wakker
2001). However, as illustrated above, attitudes toward ambiguity cannot
be captured within an expected utility framework because beliefs are
represented with probabilities. In the expected utility framework, therefore, optimism and pessimism may not be interpreted as reactions to
ambiguity.
Another advantage of a neoadditive capacity is that it parameterizes
ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism. In the model, I interpret d as the
degree of ambiguity because it is the complement of the injurer’s degree
of conﬁdence in p. I interpret a and 1 ⫺ a as the injurer’s degrees of
pessimism and optimism because they determine the respective weights
assigned to the accident and no-accident outcomes.
I can further motivate interpreting d, a, and 1 ⫺ a as the injurer’s
degrees of ambiguity, pessimism, and optimism by reference to a
multiple-priors version of the model, in which the injurer’s beliefs about
accident risk are represented by a set of probabilities “centered” around
p (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2006; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant,
forthcoming). It can be shown that equation (1) is equivalent to
Vp(c) p a min Ep(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺ a) max Ep(c),
p苸P(p)

(3)

p苸P(p)

where P(p) p {p 苸 [0, 1] : (1 ⫺ d)p ≤ p ≤ d ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p} represents the set
of accident probabilities p the injurer considers possible and Ep(c) denotes
the expected utility with respect to p of exercising level of care c given
the applicable liability rule (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2006). In this
version, I interpret d as the degree of ambiguity because it determines
and measures the size of the set P(p) . If d p 0, the injurer unambiguously
believes the probability of an accident is p (that is, P(p) p {p}). As
d r 1, the injurer considers an increasing range of accident probabilities
to be possible. For d p 1 , he believes all probabilities are possible (that
is, P(p) p [0, 1]). I interpret a and 1 ⫺ a as the injurer’s degrees of
pessimism and optimism because they correspond to the respective
weights the injurer applies to the minimum and maximum expected
utility over the set P(p) . Stated another way, I interpret a and 1 ⫺ a as
degrees of pessimism and optimism because they reﬂect the respective
degrees to which the injurer evaluates the expected utility of exercising
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level of care c by the lowest and highest accident probabilities he considers possible.
Choquet expected utility with a
neoadditive capacity m based on a probability distribution p contains as
special cases or is mathematically equivalent to several alternative models of decision making under uncertainty, including but not limited to
(1) subjective expected utility, where p represents the agent’s beliefs, if
d p 0 and a 苸 [0, 1], (2) a-maxmin expected utility with multiple priors
(Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci 2004), where the set of priors
is D p {q 苸 䉭 : q ≥ (1 ⫺ d)p} (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2006; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant, forthcoming), (3) rank-dependent expected
utility with probability weighting function q(p) p m(p) (see Wakker
1990), and (4) cumulative prospect theory with probability weighting
function q(p) p m(p) and symmetric treatment of gains and losses (see
Tversky and Wakker 1995).26
2.3.4. Relationship to Other Models.

3 . R E S U LT S

In order to establish the benchmark for comparison, I ﬁrst derive the
socially optimal level of care and state the results of the model in the
absence of ambiguity, which correspond to the standard results of the
basic unilateral accident model. I then derive the results of the model in
the presence of ambiguity.
3.1. Socially Optimal Level of Care

In conformity with Shavell (1987) and others, I assume the social goal
is to minimize total accident costs c ⫹ L(c) . That is, I assume the socially
optimal level of care c* solves
min c ⫹ L(c).

(4)

c≥0

Assuming c* is positive, it is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition

⫺L(c*)
p 1.

(5)

Equation (5) requires that the marginal reduction in expected accident
losses—that is, the marginal beneﬁt of care—equals the marginal cost
26. Additional relationships to other well-known models are identiﬁed in Appendix A.
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of care. Note that equation (5) deﬁnes the socially optimal level of care
whether accident losses are ﬁxed or variable.27
3.2. Results without Ambiguity

As noted above, in the absence of ambiguity (d p 0 ), the model reduces
to the basic unilateral accident model. In both cases of accident losses,
therefore, the results of the model without ambiguity correspond to the
standard results of the basic unilateral accident model, which may be
summarized as follows (Shavell 1987).
Proposition 1 .
Under a rule of no liability, the injurer will exercise
no care. Under strict liability, the injurer will exercise the socially optimal
level of care. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set
equal to the socially optimal level of care, the injurer will exercise the
socially optimal level of care.
Proof .
Under each liability rule, the injurer’s problem is to choose
the level of care that maximizes the expected outcome of engaging in his
activity. Because the injurer is risk neutral and his payoff k is ﬁxed, the
injurer’s problem is equivalent to minimizing his expected costs, which
equal his cost of care plus his expected liability. Speciﬁcally, under a rule
of no liability, the injurer’s problem is

min c,

(6)

c≥0

and the injurer will choose c NL p 0 ! c* . Under strict liability, the injurer’s
problem is
min c ⫹ L(c).

(7)

c≥0

Assuming the solution is positive, it is implicitly deﬁned by the condition
 SL
⫺L(c
) p 1. Together with equation (5), this implies the injurer will

27. In contrast to the standard model, in the present model minimizing total accident
costs is not necessarily equivalent to maximizing the sum of the utilities of the injurer and
the victim. They do not coincide if the injurer faces ambiguity about accident risk and he
is either optimistic or pessimistic (that is, if d 1 0 and a ( p ). However, c* is the level of
care that would be chosen by a rational social planner as part of a Pareto-optimal allocation
(see Appendix B). Accordingly, I maintain that minimizing total accident costs is the appropriate social goal. Note that Posner (2003), Eide (2005), and Bigus (2006) take the
same view. But compare Eide (2007).
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choose c SL p c* because L(c) 1 0. Under a negligence rule, the injurer’s
problem is
min
c≥0

{cc ⫹ L(c)

if c ≥ c¯
if c ! c.¯

(8)

If the court sets the standard of due care equal to the socially optimal
level of care (c̄ p c*), then the injurer will choose c N p c* because
c* p argminc ≥ c∗ c, and, given my assumptions, c* ! c* ⫹ L(c*) ≤ min {c ⫹
L(c) : c 苸 [0, c*)}. Q.E.D.
It is obvious why the injurer will exercise no care under a rule of no
liability. Under strict liability, the injurer’s marginal beneﬁt of care equals
the social marginal beneﬁt of care. Consequently, strict liability induces
the injurer to take optimal care. The reason the injurer takes optimal
care under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to
the socially optimal level of care is twofold. First, the injurer will not
exercise too much care because he faces no liability if his level of care
is at or above the socially optimal level of care. Second, the injurer will
not exercise too little care because he faces strictly liability if his level
of care is below the socially optimal level of care, and strict liability
induces him to exercise the socially optimal level of care.
The results of proposition 1 are illustrated by Figure 2, which is a
variation of a classic diagram from the tort law and economics literature
(see, for example, Shavell 1987; Miceli 1997). The curve c ⫹ L(c) represents the injurer’s expected cost schedule under strict liability, while
the thick portion of c ⫹ L(c) plus the line segment c represent the injurer’s
expected cost schedule under a negligence rule with the standard of due
care set equal to the socially optimal level of care. As shown in Figure
2, under each liability rule the injurer’s expected cost schedule attains
its minimum at the socially optimal level of care, c*.
3.3. Results under Ambiguity

I now consider the injurer’s behavior under ambiguity (d 1 0 ). I analyze
separately the cases of ﬁxed accident losses and variable accident losses.
In the case of ﬁxed accident losses, certain of the comparative statics
results will depend on a property of p(c) that I shall call local convexity
and measure by rp(c) { ⫺ [p (c)/p (c)] . The term rp(c) may be viewed as
a measure of the local convexity of p(c) because, loosely speaking, it
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Figure 2. Efﬁcient care under strict liability and negligence

measures the degree of curvature of p at c.28 I shall say that p(c) exhibits
increasing (decreasing) local convexity if rp(c) is an increasing (decreasing) function of c.
3.3.1. Fixed Accident Losses

Under a rule of no liability, whether or not an accident
occurs, the outcome for the injurer is the same: m(c) p M(c) p k ⫺ c. It
follows from equation (1) that the injurer’s problem is maxc ≥ 0 k ⫺ c,
which is equivalent to equation (6). Hence, he will choose c NL p 0 !
c*. That is, the injurer will exercise no care.
No Liability.

Under strict liability, the worst outcome is m(c) p k ⫺
c ⫺ l and the best outcome is M(c) p k ⫺ c . Accordingly, by equation (1)
the injurer’s problem is

Strict Liability.

max da(k ⫺ c ⫺ l ) ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a)(k ⫺ c)
c≥0

(9)

⫹ (1 ⫺ d){p(c)(k ⫺ c ⫺ l ) ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)](k ⫺ c)},
28. This view of rp(c) is motivated by the standard interpretation of the Arrow-Pratt
coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion ru(x) p ⫺ [u(x)/u(x)] as a measure of the curvature
of the utility function u at x (see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995,
p. 190).
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which is equivalent to
min c ⫹ dal ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c).

(10)

c≥0

Assuming that d ! 1 and the solution to equation (10) is positive, it is
implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
 SL
⫺L(c
)p

1
.
1⫺d

(11)

Equation (11) implies the following results.
Proposition 2 .
In the case of ﬁxed accident losses, the level of care
exercised by the injurer under strict liability will be less than the socially
optimal level of care. In addition, the injurer’s level of care decreases with
the degree of ambiguity. As a result, the difference between the socially
optimal level of care and the injurer’s level of care increases with the
degree of ambiguity. Furthermore, while the injurer’s level of care increases
with the magnitude of accident losses, so does the difference between the
socially optimal level of care and the injurer’s level of care if p(c) exhibits
decreasing local convexity.
Proof .

See Appendix B.

The intuition behind proposition 2 is straightforward. If equation (11) is
rewritten as ⫺(1 ⫺ d)p (c SL)l p 1, we see that ambiguity leads the injurer
to discount the marginal beneﬁt of care. As a result, the injurer will exercise
too little care. An increase in the degree of ambiguity increases the ambiguity discount but does not affect the marginal beneﬁt of care. Consequently, the injurer reduces his level of care further below the unchanged
socially optimal level of care. On the other hand, an increase in the magnitude of accident losses increases the marginal beneﬁt of care but does
not affect the ambiguity discount. Both the injurer’s level of care and the
socially optimal level of care increase in response to the increase in the
marginal beneﬁt of care. However, if the marginal beneﬁt of care decreases
too rapidly with the level of care, the ambiguity discount leads the injurer
to increase his level of care by less than the increase in the socially optimal
level of care.
Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set
equal to the socially optimal level of care (c̄ p c*), the injurer’s probNegligence.
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lem is
min
c≥0

{cc ⫹ dal ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c)

if c ≥ c*
if c ! c*.

Note that c* p argminc ≥ c∗ c and that c SL p argminc苸[0,
d)L(c). It follows that the injurer will choose
cN p

{c*c

SL

! c*

if c* ≤ F(c SL)
if c* 1 F(c SL),

(12)
c∗)

c ⫹ dal ⫹ (1 ⫺

(13)

where F(c SL) { c SL ⫹ dal ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL). Note that F(c SL) is the injurer’s
expected costs if he is negligent. Therefore, it is the expected beneﬁt of
exercising due care. Equation (13) implies the following results.
Proposition 3 .

In the case of ﬁxed accident losses, the injurer’s level
of care under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to
the socially optimal level of care will be less than or equal to the socially
optimal level of care. The likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little
care (1) increases with the degree of ambiguity if he is optimistic and
decreases therewith if he is pessimistic, (2) increases with his degree of
optimism and decreases with his degree of pessimism, and (3) increases
with the magnitude of accident losses if F(c SL) ⫺ c SL ! 1/rp(c*) and decreases
therewith if the reverse inequality holds.
Proof .

See Appendix B.

The results of proposition 3 may be understood as follows. With or
without ambiguity, the injurer will never exercise too much care under a
negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the socially
optimal level of care because he can avoid liability simply by exercising
due care. In the presence of ambiguity, however, the cost of exercising due
care, c*, may exceed the expected beneﬁt, F(c SL) , in which case the injurer
will exercise too little care. The likelihood that the injurer will exercise
too little care increases with the difference c* ⫺ F(c SL) . Because ambiguity
affects the expected beneﬁt, but not the cost, of exercising due care, variation in the likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little care in
response to changes in ambiguity or the injurer’s attitude toward ambiguity results from variation in the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care.
The expected beneﬁt of exercising due care increases with ambiguity if
the injurer is pessimistic because he reacts by further overweighting the
accident outcome; it decreases with ambiguity if the injurer is optimistic
because he reacts by further underweighting the accident outcome. Similarly, the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care increases as the injurer
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becomes relatively more pessimistic because he reacts by increasing the
weight on the accident outcome and decreases as he becomes relatively
more optimistic because he reacts by decreasing the weight on the accident
outcome. An increase in the magnitude of accident losses increases both
the cost and the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care. Whether the cost
or the expected beneﬁt increases at a faster rate depends on the relationship
between F(c SL) ⫺ c SL, the injurer’s expected liability if he is negligent, and
1/rp(c*), the inverse local convexity of p(c) at c*. When F(c SL) ⫺ c SL !
1/rp(c*), the cost of exercising due care increases more rapidly than the
expected beneﬁt, and when F(c SL) ⫺ c SL 1 1/rp(c*), the expected beneﬁt increases more rapidly than the cost. This is because F(c SL) ⫺ c SL and
1/rp(c*) are in the same proportion as the marginal expected beneﬁt and
the marginal cost of exercising due care.29
3.3.2. Variable Accident Losses

The nature of accident losses is irrelevant under a rule of
no liability. Thus, the injurer’s problem with variable accident losses is
identical to his problem with ﬁxed accident losses, and the injurer will
exercise no care—that is, c NL p 0 ! c*.

No Liability.

Strict Liability.

Under strict liability, the injurer’s problem is
max c ⫹ dal(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c).

(14)

c≥0

Assuming that d ! 1 and the solution to equation (14) is positive, it is
implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
 SL
⫺L(c
)p

1 ⫹ dal (c SL)
.
1⫺d

(15)

 SL

) ⱀ⫺L(c*)
Assuming that a 1 0, equations (5) and (15) imply ⫺L(c
as
1
 SL
⫺l (c ) ⰿ a , which in turn implies

c SL ⰿ c* as

⫺ l (c SL) ⰿ

1
a

(16)

because L(c) 1 0.30 Equations (15) and (16) imply the following results.
Proposition 4 .
In the case of variable accident losses, the injurer’s
level of care under strict liability may be less than, equal to, or greater
than the socially optimal level of care, where equality is a borderline case.
29. To see this, note that ⭸F(cSL)/⭸l p [F(cSL) ⫺ cSL] /l and ⭸c*/⭸l p 1/rp(c*)l.
30. Note that equation (15) requires ⫺l (cSL) ! 1/da because L(c) ! 0.
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The injurer’s level of care decreases with his degree of optimism and
increases with his degree of pessimism. As a result, the likelihood that the
injurer will exercise too little care increases with his degree of optimism
and decreases with his degree of pessimism. Conversely, the likelihood
that the injurer will exercise too much care decreases with his degree of
optimism and increases with his degree of pessimism. The injurer’s level
of care decreases with the degree of ambiguity if he is optimistic or if he
 SL
is pessimistic and a ! L(c
)/l (c SL) and increases therewith if he is pessi SL
 SL
mistic and a 1 L(c )/l (c ). Accordingly, the likelihood that the injurer will
exercise too little care increases with the degree of ambiguity if he is
 SL
optimistic or if he is pessimistic and a ! L(c
)/l (c SL) and decreases there SL
 SL
with if he is pessimistic and a 1 L(c )/l (c ). Conversely, the likelihood
that the injurer will exercise too much care decreases with the degree of
 SL
ambiguity if he is optimistic or if he is pessimistic and a ! L(c
)/l (c SL) and
 SL
increases therewith if he is pessimistic and a 1 L(c
)/l (c SL).
Proof .

See Appendix B.

To understand why ambiguity may lead the injurer to exercise too little
or too much care under strict liability in the case of variable accident
 SL
losses, rewrite equation (15) as ⫺(1 ⫺ d)L(c
) ⫺ dal (c SL) p 1 . We see that
while ambiguity leads the injurer to discount the beneﬁt from a marginal
reduction in expected accident losses, it also leads the injurer to beneﬁt
from a marginal reduction in the magnitude of accident losses per se,
which latter beneﬁt increases with the injurer’s degree of pessimism. If the
latter beneﬁt is sufﬁciently large and the injurer is sufﬁciently pessimistic,
he will ﬁnd it worthwhile to increase his level of care above the socially
optimal level of care, notwithstanding the ambiguity discount on expected
accident losses. Otherwise, as in the case of ﬁxed accident losses, the
ambiguity discount will cause the injurer to exercise too little care.
The comparative statics results on optimism, pessimism, and ambiguity
are consistent with the corresponding results of propositions 3 and 5 and
form part of a general ﬁnding that the injurer’s level of care decreases
with his degree of optimism, increases with his degree of pessimism, and
decreases or increases with the degree of ambiguity depending on whether
he is optimistic or pessimistic, respectively.31 This ﬁnding agrees with my
31. It should be noted that, unlike in propositions 3 and 5, the comparative statics
result with respect to ambiguity in proposition 4 does not match the general ﬁnding precisely. However, it deviates only when p(cSL) ! a ! L(cSL)/l (cSL) p p(cSL) ⫹ [p(cSL)/
l (cSL)]l(cSL), and this range will be narrow provided that the marginal reduction in the
magnitude of accident losses is sufﬁciently greater than the marginal reduction in the
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basic intuition, for it seems natural that if and to the extent the injurer
reacts to ambiguity in an optimistic way by overweighing the no-accident
outcome, he would tend to reduce his level of care, and if and to the
extent the injurer reacts to ambiguity in a pessimistic way by overweighting
the accident outcome, he would tend to increase his level of care. It is
also consistent with the general thinking of legal scholars (see Posner
2003).
Negligence. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set
equal to the socially optimal level of care, the injurer’s problem is

min
c≥0

{cc ⫹ dal(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c)

if c ≥ c*
if c ! c*.

(17)

If ⫺l (c SL) ≥ a1 , then the injurer will choose c N p c* ≤ c SL because c* p
argminc ≥ c∗ c and c* ! c* ⫹ dal(c*) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c*) ≤ min {c ⫹ dal(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺
d)L(c) : c 苸 [0, c*)}. If ⫺l (c SL) ! a1 , then c SL ! c*, and the injurer will
choose
cN p

{c*c

SL

! c*

if c* ≤ G(c SL)
if c* 1 G(c SL),

(18)

where G(c SL) { c SL ⫹ dal(c SL) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL), because c* p argminc ≥ c∗ c
and c SL p argminc苸[0, c∗)c ⫹ dal(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c). The injurer’s decision
rules imply the following results.
Proposition 5 .
In the case of variable accident losses, the injurer’s
level of care under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set
equal to the socially optimal level of care will be less than or equal to the
socially optimal level of care. The likelihood that the injurer will exercise
too little care (1) increases with his degree of optimism and decreases with
his degree of pessimism and (2) increases with the degree of ambiguity if
he is optimistic and decreases therewith if he is pessimistic.
Proof .

See Appendix B.

The results of proposition 5 follow from previous results. The injurer
may exercise too little care under negligence for the same reason he may
exercise too little care under strict liability: he discounts the marginal
beneﬁt of care. The injurer will never exercise too much care under negligence because, as noted above, he can avoid liability by exercising the
socially optimal level of care. The comparative statics results on optimism,
probability of an accident at cSL or that the magnitude of accident losses given cSL is
sufﬁciently small, either or both of which it seems reasonable to assume.
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pessimism, and ambiguity support the ﬁnding that, in general, the injurer’s
level of care decreases with optimism, increases with pessimism, and decreases or increases with ambiguity depending on whether he is optimistic
or pessimistic, respectively.

4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

This section develops a simple numerical example in order to illustrate
the results of the model. Throughout the example, I assume that
1. the probability of an accident is p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c);
2. the degree of ambiguity may be zero, low, or high: d 苸 {0,
9/25, 21/25}; and
3. the injurer’s degree of pessimism may be low or high: a 苸
{1/50, 39/50}.
Note that p(c) is strictly decreasing, strictly convex, and exhibits
decreasing local convexity.32 In addition, it turns out that p(c) 苸
(1/50, 39/50) for each level of care the injurer may exercise. Accordingly,
the injurer is optimistic when his degree of pessimism is low and pessimistic when his degree of pessimism is high.
4.1. Fixed Accident Losses

To begin, suppose accident losses are ﬁxed and their magnitude may be
low or high: l 苸 {25, 36}. Given our assumptions, the socially optimal
level of care is c* p 冑l ⫺ 1. Thus, c* p 4 when accident losses are low
and c* p 5 when accident losses are high.
Under strict liability, the injurer’s level of care is
冑
c p (1 ⫺ d) l ⫺ 1. Note that the injurer’s level of care does not depend
on his degree of pessimism, a. Table 1 sets forth the socially optimal
level of care, c*, and the injurer’s level of care, c SL, for each possible
pair (l, d). From Table 1 we can see the following results.
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity,
but in the presence of ambiguity he will take too little care.
2. Increasing ambiguity progressively reduces the injurer’s level of
care below the socially optimal level of care. In particular, as the degree
of ambiguity increases from zero to low to high, the injurer’s level of
4.1.1. Strict Liability.
SL

32. To see this, note that p (c) p ⫺1/(1 ⫹ c)2 ! 0, p (c) p 2/(1 ⫹ c)3 1 0, and rp (c) p
⫺2/(1 ⫹ c)2 ! 0.
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Table 1. Levels of Care under Strict
Liability with Fixed Accident Losses

(l, d)
(25,
(25,
(25,
(36,
(36,
(36,

0)
9/25)
21/25)
0)
9/25)
21/25)

c*

cSL

4
4
4
5
5
5

4
3
1
5
3.8
1.4

care falls from 4 to 3 to 1 if accident losses are low and from 5 to 3.8
to 1.4 if accident losses are high.
3. While the injurer’s level of care increases in response to an increase
in the magnitude of accident losses, the gap between the injurer’s level
of care and the socially optimal level of care increases as well. Speciﬁcally,
if accident losses increase from low to high, the socially optimal level
of care increases by 1 while the injurer’s level of care increases only by
.8 if ambiguity is low and by .4 if ambiguity is high.
Each of these results is consistent with proposition 2. Figure 3 illustrates the second result assuming low accident costs and a high degree
of pessimism. Figure 4 illustrates the third result assuming a low degree
of ambiguity and a high degree of pessimism.
4.1.2. Negligence. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care
set equal to the socially optimal level of care, the injurer will exercise
due care if the cost, c*, does not exceed the expected beneﬁt, F(c SL) {
c SL ⫹ dal ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL); otherwise he will exercise c SL . Table 2 sets forth
the relevant cost-beneﬁt calculations and speciﬁes the injurer’s level of
care, c N, for each possible triple (l, d, a) . From Table 2 we can see the
following results.
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity if
ambiguity is low or if he is pessimistic. The injurer will exercise too little
care only when ambiguity is high and he is optimistic.
2. Increasing ambiguity progressively reduces the expected beneﬁt
of exercising due care if the injurer is optimistic and progressively increases it if he is pessimistic. In particular, if the injurer is optimistic, as
the degree of ambiguity increases from zero to low to high, the expected
beneﬁt of exercising due care falls from 9 to 7.18 to 3.42 if accident
losses are low and from 11 to 8.86 to 4.40 if accident losses are high.
If the injurer is pessimistic, however, as the degree of ambiguity increases
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Figure 3. Effect on care of increasing ambiguity under strict liability with ﬁxed accident
losses.

from zero to low to high, the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care
rises from 9 to 14.02 to 19.38 if accident losses are low and from 11
to 18.71 to 27.39 if accident losses are high.
3. In the presence of ambiguity, the expected beneﬁt of exercising
due care increases with the injurer’s degree of pessimism. Speciﬁcally,
when ambiguity is low, as the injurer’s degree of pessimism increases
from low to high, the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care rises from
7.18 to 14.02 if accident losses are low and from 8.86 to 18.71 if accident
losses are high. When ambiguity is high, as the injurer’s degree of pessimism increases from low to high, the expected beneﬁt of exercising
due care leaps from 3.42 to 19.38 if accident losses are low and from
4.40 to 27.39 if accident losses are high.
4. While both the cost and the expected beneﬁt of exercising due
care increase in response to an increase in the magnitude of accident
losses, the gap between them increases as well.
All four results are consistent with proposition 3. Note that the second and third results are consistent because the likelihood that the injurer
will exercise too little care varies inversely with the expected beneﬁt of
exercising due care in response to changes in ambiguity or the injurer’s
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Figure 4. Effect on care of increasing ﬁxed accident losses under strict liability

attitude toward ambiguity. To see that the fourth result is consistent,
note that (1) when ambiguity is high and the injurer is optimistic,
1/rp(c* p 4) p 2.5 1 2.42 p F(c SL) ⫺ c SL, and the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care increases by less than the cost when the magnitude of
accident losses increases from low to high and (2) in all other cases,
F(c SL) ⫺ c SL 1 2.5 p 1/rp(c* p 4), and the expected beneﬁt of exercising
due care increases by more than the cost when the magnitude of accident
losses increases from low to high. Figure 5 illustrates how an optimistic
injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity or if ambiguity
is low but will exercise too little care when ambiguity is high. It assumes
that accident losses are low.
4.2. Variable Accident Losses

Next suppose that accident losses are variable and their magnitude is
given by l(c) p 108/ (1 ⫹ c). Under this assumption, the socially optimal
level of care is c* p 5.
4.2.1. Strict Liability. Table 3 sets forth the socially optimal level of
care, c*, and the injurer’s level of care, c SL, for each possible pair (d,
a). From Table 3 we can see the following results.
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity,
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Table 2. The Injurer’s Level of Care under Negligence with Fixed Accident Losses

(l, d, a)

c*

cSL

F(cSL)

cN

(25,
(25,
(25,
(25,
(25,
(25,
(36,
(36,
(36,
(36,
(36,
(36,

4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5

4
4
3
3
1
1
5
5
3.8
3.8
1.4
1.4

9
9
7.18
14.02
3.42
19.38
11
11
8.86
18.71
4.40
27.39

4
4
4
4
1
4
5
5
5
5
1.4
5

0, 1/50)
0, 39/50)
9/25, 1/50)
9/25, 39/50)
21/25, 1/50)
21/25, 39/50)
0, 1/50)
0, 39/50)
9/25, 1/50)
9/25, 39/50)
21/25, 1/50)
21/25, 39/50)

but in the presence of ambiguity he will exercise too little care when he
is optimistic and too much care when he is pessimistic.
2. For any given degree of ambiguity, the injurer’s level of care
increases with his degree of pessimism.
3. The injurer’s level of care decreases with ambiguity when he is
optimistic and increases with ambiguity when he is pessimistic.
Figures 6 and 7 collectively illustrate all three results, each of which
is consistent with proposition 4. In particular, with respect to the third
result note that because c SL ≥ 2.44, a p 39/50 1 2/ (1 ⫹ c SL) p L (c SL) /
l (c SL).
Table 4 sets forth the relevant cost-beneﬁt calculations and speciﬁes the injurer’s level of care, c N , for each possible pair
(d, a). Recall that the injurer will exercise due care if c* ≤ G(c SL) {
c SL ⫹ dal(c SL) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL); otherwise he will exercise c SL . From Table
4 we can see the following results.
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity if
ambiguity is low or if he is pessimistic. The injurer will exercise too little
care only when ambiguity is high and he is optimistic.
2. In the presence of ambiguity, the expected beneﬁt of exercising
due care increases with the injurer’s degree of pessimism. Speciﬁcally,
when ambiguity is low, as the injurer’s degree of pessimism increases
from low to high, the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care rises from
6.91 to 11.74. When ambiguity is high, as the injurer’s degree of pessimism increases from low to high, the expected beneﬁt of exercising
due care leaps from 4.43 to 16.06.
3. Increasing ambiguity progressively reduces the expected beneﬁt
4.2.2. Negligence.
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Figure 5. Effect on care of increasing ambiguity under negligence with ﬁxed accident losses

of exercising due care if the injurer is optimistic and progressively increases it if he is pessimistic. In particular, if the injurer is optimistic, as
the degree of ambiguity increases from zero to low to high, the expected
beneﬁt of exercising due care falls from 8 to 6.91 to 4.43. If the injurer
is pessimistic, however, as the degree of ambiguity increases from zero
to low to high, the expected beneﬁt of exercising due care rises from 8
to 11.74 to 16.06.
Note that each of the results is consistent with proposition 5.

5. DISCUSSION

The results of the model suggest that neither strict liability nor negligence
is generally efﬁcient in the presence of ambiguity. Under both liability
rules the injurer may exercise too little care, and under strict liability
he even may exercise too much care in the case of variable accident
losses. In addition, the injurer’s level of care generally decreases with
optimism, increases with pessimism, and decreases or increases with
ambiguity depending on whether he is optimistic or pessimistic, respectively.
A further implication of the results is that negligence is more robust
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Table 3. Levels of Care under Strict Liability
with Variable Accident Losses

(d, a)

c*

cSL

(0, 1/50)
(0, 39/50)
(9/25, 1/50)
(9/25, 39/50)
(21/25, 1/50)
(21/25, 39/50)

5
5
5
5
5
5

5
5
4.22
6.06
2.44
7.65

to ambiguity, which implies that negligence may be superior to strict
liability in unilateral accident cases. Generally speaking, in the presence
of ambiguity, strict liability is never efﬁcient (save only a borderline case
when accident losses are variable), while negligence is efﬁcient for a
range of model parameter values. More speciﬁcally, the results suggest
that although we might expect the two liability rules to perform equally
poorly to the extent that optimism is the prevailing attitude toward
ambiguity with respect to accident risk (as the psychology literature
appears to suggest), we would expect negligence to outperform strict
liability in unilateral accident contexts in which people are sufﬁciently
pessimistic (for example, where an accident is highly available in the
sense used in the psychology literature). Of course, an important countervailing factor is that strict liability is less costly for a court to implement. Nevertheless, the implication that negligence is more robust to
ambiguity may help explain why it is the predominant liability rule in
modern tort law.
Whatever the relative merits of strict liability and negligence, the basic
result remains that neither liability rule is generally efﬁcient when the
injurer faces ambiguity with respect to accident risk. The exercise then
is to design a liability rule that will induce the injurer to exercise optimal
care in the face of ambiguity. One approach is to modify strict liability
or negligence to include an adjustment to damages, which may be positive or negative, that equates the injurer’s costs with total accident costs.
Let h denote such adjustment. In the case of variable accident losses,33
h is implicitly deﬁned by
c ⫹ da[l(c) ⫹ h] ⫹ (1 ⫺ d){p(c)[l(c) ⫹ h]} p c ⫹ p(c)l(c).

(19)

33. I derive h for the case of variable accident losses because it is the more general
case. The case of ﬁxed accident losses is the special case in which l(c) p l for some scalar
l 1 0.

ACCIDENT MODEL UNDER AMBIGUITY /

461

Figure 6. Effect on care of increasing ambiguity under strict liability with variable accident
losses if the injurer is optimistic.

Rearranging terms gives
hp

dl(c)[p(c) ⫺ a]
.
da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c)

(20)

It follows immediately from equation (20) that
h ⱀ 0 as p(c) ⱀ a

(21)

increases with Fp(c) ⫺ aF.

(22)

and that
FhF

That is, (1) the adjustment will be positive when the injurer is optimistic,
negative when he is pessimistic, and zero when he is neither optimistic
nor pessimistic, and (2) the absolute magnitude of the adjustment increases as the injurer becomes more optimistic or pessimistic, as the case
may be. Consequently, in light of the comparative statics results on
optimism and pessimism, we may interpret h as a scaled (by the magnitude of accident losses) ambiguity adjustment that operates to punish
optimism and the resulting tendency to decrease care and to reward
pessimism and the resulting tendency to increase care. It is straightforward to demonstrate the efﬁciency of an ambiguity-adjusted rule of strict
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Figure 7. Effect on care of increasing ambiguity under strict liability with variable accident
losses if the injurer is pessimistic.

liability or negligence. Under an ambiguity-adjusted rule of strict liability,
the injurer faces equation (7) and accordingly will choose c SL p c* . Under an ambiguity-adjusted negligence rule, the injurer faces equation (8)
and accordingly will choose c N p c*.
It is worth noting that modifying negligence to include an adjustment
to the standard of due care rather than to damages is not a viable
alternative approach. Suppose ambiguity would lead an injurer to exercise suboptimal care under a negligence rule with the standard of due
care set equal to the socially optimal level of care. A downward adjustment of the standard of due care below the socially optimal level of
care could not induce the injurer to exercise the socially optimal level
of care because the injurer’s level of care would never exceed the standard
of due care under a rule of negligence. To see that an upward adjustment
of the standard of due care above the socially optimal level of care could
not induce the injurer to exercise the socially optimal level of care,
consider the case of variable accident losses (which includes ﬁxed accident losses as a special case). By assumption, the injurer would choose
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Table 4. The Injurer’s Level of Care under Negligence with Variable Accident
Losses

(d, a)

c*

cSL

G(cSL)

cN

(0, 1/50)
(0, 39/50)
(9/25, 1/50)
(9/25, 39/50)
(21/25, 1/50)
(21/25, 39/50)

5
5
5
5
5
5

5
5
4.22
6.06
2.44
7.65

8
8
6.91
11.74
4.43
16.06

5
5
5
5
2.44
5

c N ! c* under a negligence rule with c¯ p c*. This implies that c N p
c SL ! c*, that the injurer’s decision rule is given by
cN p

{cc¯

SL

if c¯ ≤ G(c SL)
! c¯ if c¯ 1 G(c SL),

and that c¯ 1 G(c SL). It follows that increasing c¯ such that c¯ 1 c* would
not induce the injurer to choose c N p c* because it still would be the
case that c̄ 1 G(c SL) and, therefore, the injurer still would choose c N p
c SL ! c*.
One can imagine (at least) two objections to an ambiguity-adjusted
liability rule. First, one could object that it is unworkable because the
adjustment requires the court to determine the injurer’s degree of and
attitude toward ambiguity—d and a—which are unobservable. While
the unobservability of d and a may preclude the court from perfectly
implementing the ambiguity adjustment, the court conceivably could use
observable characteristics of the injurer as proxies or instruments for d
and a in a second-best implementation.34 Second, one could object that
an ambiguity-adjusted liability rule is unfair because the adjustment to
damages is based not on the injurer’s acts (that is, his level of care) but
rather on his beliefs (that is, his degree of and attitude toward ambiguity). Many legal determinations, however, are based on a person’s
state of mind. In criminal cases, for example, whether a harmful act
constitutes a crime, and quite often the degree of criminal liability, depends on the defendant’s state of mind, or mens rea. Perhaps more on
point, courts may award exemplary or punitive damages in tort cases
on the basis that the harmful act was intentional, willful, wanton, or
34. In addition, recall that, in conformity with the basic accident model, I assume the
court can accurately determine all relevant facts, including the agents’ preferences. Under
this assumption, which is central to the basic accident model, the court would be able to
determine d and a and perfectly implement the ambiguity adjustment.
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malicious. In addition, the purpose of the ambiguity adjustment is not
to punish or reward the injurer’s beliefs but to cause the injurer to
internalize the external social costs of suboptimal care. In this sense, it
is analogous to a Pigouvian corrective tax and subsidy scheme and may
be justiﬁed on the same grounds.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper generalizes the basic unilateral accident model of tort law
and economics to allow for ambiguity with respect to accident risk.
Standard formulations of the basic accident model are based on the
expected utility framework, in which agents’ beliefs about the likelihood
of uncertain events are represented by probabilities. As a result, the
standard models do not allow for ambiguity with respect to accident
risk and cannot accommodate optimistic or pessimistic attitudes toward
ambiguity. The Ellsberg paradox and related experimental evidence,
however, suggest the importance of attitudes toward ambiguity for individual decision making generally. Moreover, psychology research suggests that people exhibit optimism and pessimism in the accident context.
To incorporate ambiguity into the basic unilateral accident model, I
recast the model in the Choquet expected utility framework and represent the injurer’s beliefs about accident risk with a neoadditive capacity. Choquet expected utility is a generalization of expected utility
that allows for ambiguity. Under Choquet expected utility theory, agents’
beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events are represented by a
nonadditive probability, or a capacity. The nonadditivity of the capacity
allows for different attitudes toward ambiguity. A neoadditive capacity
is a special type of capacity that is based on a probability distribution.
That is, it is a probability weighting function. Choquet expected utility
with a neoadditive capacity amounts to a weighted sum of the minimum
utility, the maximum utility, and the expected utility with respect to the
probability distribution on which the neoadditive capacity is based.
I represent the injurer’s beliefs with a neoadditive capacity for several
reasons. First, numerous empirical studies indicate that individuals
weight probabilities in a manner consistent with a neoadditive capacity,
and there is experimental evidence that preferences have the form suggested by Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive capacity. Second,
a neoadditive capacity lends itself to concrete notions of ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism. Ambiguity corresponds to an agent’s lack of
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conﬁdence in his belief about the probability of uncertain events, while
optimism and pessimism correspond to an agent overweighting the best
and worst outcomes, respectively. Moreover, a neoadditive capacity parameterizes ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism, which allows me to
perform comparative statics on changes in their degrees. Finally, Choquet
expected utility with a neoadditive capacity is tractable and also quite
general in that it includes as special cases or is mathematically equivalent
to a number of alternative models of decision making under uncertainty.
The central result of the model is that, in the basic unilateral accident
setting, neither strict liability nor negligence is generally efﬁcient in the
presence of ambiguity. This is in contrast to the standard results of the
basic unilateral accident model, namely, that both strict liability and
negligence are efﬁcient. In particular, I show that (1) under strict liability,
the injurer will exercise too little care in the case of ﬁxed accident losses
and may exercise too little or too much care in the case of variable
accident losses and (2) under a negligence rule with the standard of due
care set equal to the socially optimal level of care, the injurer may exercise too little care in both cases on accident losses. In addition, I ﬁnd
that, in general, the injurer’s level of care decreases with his degree of
optimism, increases with his degree of pessimism, and decreases or increases with the degree of ambiguity depending on whether the injurer
is optimistic or pessimistic, respectively.
The basic intuition behind the main results may be summarized as
follows. Ambiguity has two effects on the injurer’s incentives to take
care under strict liability. On the one hand, ambiguity leads the injurer
to discount the beneﬁt from a reduction in expected accident losses,
which causes the injurer to tend to reduce his level of care. On the other
hand, ambiguity leads the injurer to beneﬁt from a reduction in the
magnitude of accident losses per se, which causes the injurer to tend to
increase his level of care. In the case of ﬁxed accident losses, the injurer
cannot affect the magnitude of accident losses, so only the former effect
applies, and the injurer will exercise too little care. In the case of variable
accident losses, whether the injurer exercises too little or too much care
depends on which of the two effects dominates. The former effect will
dominate and the injurer will exercise too little care if the marginal
beneﬁt from a reduction in expected accident losses exceeds the marginal
beneﬁt from a reduction in the magnitude of accident losses and the
injurer is optimistic or not too pessimistic. Otherwise, the latter effect
will dominate, and the injurer will exercise too much care. The injurer
will take optimal care only in the borderline case in which the two effects
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perfectly offset. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care
set equal to the socially optimal level of care, the injurer faces no liability
if he satisﬁes the standard of due care and faces strict liability otherwise.
Accordingly, if per the above analysis the injurer would exercise optimal
care or even too much care under strict liability, then he will take optimal
care under negligence. If, however, the injurer would exercise too little
care under strict liability, he may or may not exercise optimal care under
negligence depending on whether the expected beneﬁt of exercising due
care, which equals his expected costs of being negligent, exceeds the cost
of exercising due care, which is the price of facing no liability.
A key implication of the results of the model is that negligence is
more robust to ambiguity. This suggests that negligence may be superior
to strict liability in unilateral accident cases. It also may help explain
why negligence is the general basis for accident liability under modern
Anglo-American tort law.
The model’s results and implications aside, a principal contribution
of this paper is that it proposes a method to generalize the basic accident
model to allow for ambiguity with respect to accident risk. The scope
of the model presented is limited to the case of unilateral accidents with
ﬁxed activity levels. Natural extensions of this paper, therefore, include
introducing ambiguity in the case of unilateral accidents with variable
activity levels and in the more general case of bilateral accidents, including bilateral care and harm, with ﬁxed and variable activity levels.
In addition, future research could examine the implications of ambiguity
for the economic analysis of other basic areas of law such as contracts,
property, and criminal law, as well as other traditional law and economics topics such as litigation and settlement.
A P P E N D I X A:

CHOQUET EXPECTED UTILITY FRAMEWORK

A1. General Framework

Let S be a nonempty, ﬁnite set of states. Associated with S is a set of events E,
which I take to be the power set of S. Let X O ⺢ be a nonempty, ﬁnite set of
outcomes and let F p {f : S r X} be a set of simple functions from states to
outcomes, called simple acts. Let u : X r ⺢ be a monotone increasing function
from outcomes to real numbers. I interpret u as a Bernoulli utility function.
I now deﬁne a capacity and the Choquet integral of a simple act with respect
to a capacity.
Deﬁnition 1: Capacity.

A capacity is a function m : E r ⺢ that satisﬁes
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monotonicity: E, F 苸 E and E P F imply m (E) ≤ m (F); and normalization:
m(⭋) p 0 and m(S) p 1.
Note that a probability distribution is a special case of a capacity that satisﬁes
additivity: E, F 苸 E, and E ∩ F p ⭋ imply m(E) ⫹ m(F) p m(E ∪ F).
Deﬁnition 2: Choquet Integral. Let f : S r X be a simple act that takes
on the values x1 ≥ … ≥ xn. The Choquet integral of f with respect to a capacity m
is deﬁned as

冕

冘
n

fdm : p

xi[m({s 苸 SFf(s) ≥ xi }) ⫺ m({s 苸 SFf(s) 1 xi })].

(A1)

ip1

I interpret the Choquet integral as the expected value of the simple act f with
respect to the capacity m. The Choquet integral of the composition u (f(s)) with
respect to the capacity m is deﬁned as the Choquet expected utility of f with respect
to m.35
A neoadditive capacity is a special type of capacity that is based on a probability distribution.
Deﬁnition 3: Neoadditive Capacity. Let d and a be real numbers such
that 0 ≤ d, a ≤ 1. A neoadditive capacity n based on a probability distribution p
is deﬁned as

{

for E p ⭋
OE OS
for ⭋ (
(
for E p S.

0
n(E) : p d(1 ⫺ a) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(E)
1

(A2)

A neoadditive capacity is additive on nonextreme outcomes, hence the name. I
interpret the additive part of a neoadditive capacity as follows: p represents the
agent’s beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events, and 1 ⫺ d represents the
agent’s degree of conﬁdence in this belief. The complement of the degree of conﬁdence is the degree of ambiguity d.
It can be shown that the Choquet integral of a simple act f with respect to
a neoadditive capacity n based on p is given by

冕

冘
n

fdn p daxn ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a)x1 ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)

xi p({s 苸 SFf(s) p xi }),

(A3)

ip1

where f takes on the values x1 ≥ … ≥ xn (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant,
forthcoming). Thus, with respect to a neoadditive capacity, the Choquet integral
of a simple act f is the weighted sum of the worst outcome under f, the best
outcome under f, and the expected value of f with respect to p.
35. Note that the composition u (f(s)) : S r ⺢ is a simple act.
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It follows that the Choquet expected utility of the simple act f with respect
to the neoadditive capacity n based on p is given by
Vp(f ) : p

冘

冕

u(f )dn p dau(xn ) ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a)u(x1) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)Ep(f ),

(A4)

n

where Ep(f ) { ip1 u(xi)p ({s 苸 SFu (f(s)) p u(xi)}) . That is, it is the weighted sum
of the minimum utility under f, the maximum utility under f, and the expected
utility of f with respect to p. I interpret a as the degree of pessimism and 1 ⫺
a as the degree of optimism because they determine the weights given to the
minimum utility and the maximum utility. As stated above, I interpret 1 ⫺ d as
the degree of conﬁdence in p and d as the degree of ambiguity. Note that in the
absence of ambiguity (d p 0), Choquet expected utility reduces to expected
utility.
A2. The Model

When the model is placed in this framework, the state space is S p {accident,
no accident}. The outcome space is X p {m(c) , M(c)} , where m(c) and M(c) depend
on the applicable liability rule. Because a negligence rule effectively imposes no
liability if c ≤ c¯ and strict liability if c 1 c¯ , I need to deﬁne only m(c) and M(c)
for the rules of no liability and strict liability. Under a rule of no liability,
m(c) p M(c) p k ⫺ c. Under strict liability, m(c) p k ⫺ c ⫺ l(c) and M(c) p k ⫺
c. The set of acts is F p {f(c) : c ≥ 0}, where
f(c) p

m(c)
{M(c)

if s p accident
if s p no accident.

The injurer’s Bernoulli utility function is u [f(c)] p f(c).
The injurer’s beliefs about accident risk are given by a neoadditive capacity
n based on the probability distribution p p {p(c), 1 ⫺ p(c)} . With a slight abuse
of notation, I say that n is based on p, and I deﬁne n(p) : p n(accident), n(1 ⫺
p) : p n(no accident), and Vp(c) : p Vp (f(c)). In addition, I deﬁne Ep(c) : p
p(c)m(c) ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)] M(c). It follows that the injurer’s Choquet expected utility
of exercising level of care c under a rule of no liability or strict liability is
Vp(c) p dam(c) ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a)M(c) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)Ep(c) and under a negligence rule is
no liability
{VV (c)(c) under
under strict liability
p

p

if c ≥ c¯
¯
if c ! c.

A3. Relation to Other Models

A principal advantage of Choquet expected utility with a neoadditive capacity
is that it contains as special cases or is mathematically equivalent to several
alternative models of decision making under uncertainty. Special cases include
(see, for example, Schipper 2005) subjective expected utility, if d p 0 and a 苸
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[0, 1]; maxmin expected utility (Wald 1950), if d p 1 and a p 1; maxmax expected utility, if d p 1 and a p 0; and the Hurwicz (1951) criterion, if d p 1
and a 苸 [0, 1]. Additional special cases include maxmin expected utility with
multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), if d 苸 [0, 1] and a p 1 ; and maxmax expected utility with multiple priors, if d 苸 [0, 1] and a p 0 , in each case
where the set of priors is D p {q 苸 䉭 : q ≥ (1 ⫺ d)p} and p denotes the probability
distribution on which the neoadditive capacity is based (see Eichberger and
Kelsey 2006).
With a neoadditive capacity m based on p, Choquet expected utility is mathematically equivalent to subjective expected utility where the subjective probability of the least favorable event W is qW p (1 ⫺ d)pW ⫹ da , the most favorable
event B is qB p (1 ⫺ d)pB ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a), and every other event E is qE p (1 ⫺ d)pE;
a-maxmin expected utility with multiple priors (Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci 2004) where the set of priors is D p {q 苸 䉭 : q ≥ (1 ⫺ d)p} (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2006; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant, forthcoming);
rank-dependent expected utility with probability weighting function q(p) p
m(p) (see Wakker 1990); and cumulative prospect theory with probability weighting function q(p) p m(p) and symmetric treatment of gains and losses (see Tversky
and Wakker 1995).
APPENDIX B : PROOFS

B1. Social Planner’s Problem

Here I prove the assertion, made in footnote 27, that c* is the level of care that
would be chosen by a rational social planner as part of a Pareto-optimal allocation. Let w and v denote the initial wealth of the injurer and the victim,
respectively. Let wa and va denote the wealth of the injurer and the victim, respectively, in the event of an accident, and let wn and vn denote the wealth of
the injurer and the victim, respectively, in the event of no accident. The social
planner’s problem is
max
c≥0
wa , wn, va , vn ≥ 0

p(c)va ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)]vn

(B1)

subject to
¯
dawa ⫹ d(1 ⫺ a)wn ⫹ (1 ⫺ d){p(c)wa ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)]wn } p V

(B2)

and
{p(c)va ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)]vn } ⫹ {p(c)wa ⫹ [1 ⫺ p(c)]wn } ⫹ c ⫹ L(c) p w ⫹ k ⫹ v.

(B3)

The foregoing expresses the social planner’s problem as maximizing the expected
utility of the victim subject to meeting a required Choquet expected utility level
for the injurer V̄ and a resource constraint in which expected resource use equals
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the available resources. Expected resource use is calculated using objective accident risk because the social planner is rational. The solution to the social
planner’s problem is a Pareto-optimal allocation. We may assume, without loss
of generality, that wa p wn. With this assumption, the social planner’s problem
¯ ⫺ c ⫺ L(c), which is equivalent to choosing
reduces to maxc ≥ 0 w ⫹ k ⫹ v ⫺ V
c ≥ 0 to minimize total accident costs c ⫹ L(c). Q.E.D.
B2. Proof of Proposition 2
 SL
By assumption, d 苸 (0, 1). Thus, equations (5) and (11) imply ⫺L(c
)p

, which in turn implies c SL ! c* because L(c) 1 0.
1/ (1 ⫺ d) 1 1 p ⫺L(c*)

Implicitly differentiating equations (5) and (11) with respect to d, we have
⭸c SL/⭸d p ⫺1/ [L(c SL)(1 ⫺ d)2 ] ! 0 p ⭸c*/⭸d because L(c) 1 0. Hence, c SL is decreasing in d, and the difference c* ⫺ c SL is increasing in d.
Implicitly differentiating equations (5) and (11) with respect to l, we have
⭸c*/⭸l p ⫺[p (c*)/p (c*)l] 1 0 and ⭸c SL/⭸l p ⫺[p (c SL)/p (c SL)l] 1 0 because p (c) !
0 and p (c) 1 0. Furthermore, if rp(c) p ⫺[p (c)/p (c)] is a decreasing function of
c, then ⭸c*/⭸l p 1/rp(c*)l 1 1/rp(c sl)l p ⭸c SL/⭸l because c SL ! c*. Therefore, although c SL is increasing in l, the difference c* ⫺ c SL is increasing in l if p(c) exhibits
decreasing local convexity. Q.E.D.

B3. Proof of Proposition 3

Recall that F(c SL) { c SL ⫹ dal ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL). Equation (13) immediately implies
c N ≤ c* because model parameters exist such that c* ≤ F(c SL) and c* 1 F(c SL) . For
example, suppose p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c) , l p 49, d p 24/49, and a p 1/5. It follows
that c* p 6.0 ≤ 13.8 p F(c SL). Now suppose p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c), l p 49, d p
45/49, and a p 1/100. Then we have c* p 6.0 1 3.45 p F(c SL).
Now, by the envelope theorem, ⭸F(c SL)/⭸d p al ⫺ L(c SL) p [a ⫺ p(c SL)]l . It follows that ⭸F(c SL)/⭸d ! 0 p ⭸c*/⭸d if a ! p(c SL) and that ⭸F(c SL)/⭸d 1 0 p ⭸c*/⭸d if
a 1 p(c SL). Thus, the likelihood that F(c SL) ! c*, and therefore that c SL ! c*, increases with d if the injurer is optimistic and decreases with d if the injurer is
pessimistic.
In addition, by the envelope theorem, ⭸F(c SL)/⭸a p dl 1 0 p ⭸c*/⭸a . Hence,
the likelihood that F(c SL) ! c*, and therefore that c SL ! c*, increases with 1 ⫺ a
and decreases with a.
Finally, by the envelope theorem, ⭸F(c SL)/⭸l p da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c SL) , which implies that ⭸F(c SL)/⭸l ⱀ ⭸c*/⭸l as da ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)p(c SL) ⱀ 1/rp(c*)l, or as F(c SL) ⫺
c SL ⱀ 1/rp(c*). Thus, the likelihood that F(c SL) ! c*, and therefore that c SL ! c*,
increases with l if F(c SL) ⫺ c SL ! 1/rp(c*) and decreases with l if F(c SL) ⫺ c SL 1
1/rp(c*). Q.E.D.
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B4. Proof of Proposition 4

Equation (16) immediately implies c SL ⰿ c* because model parameters exist such
that ⫺l (c SL) ⰿ a1 . For example, suppose p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c), l(c) p 1,000e⫺c, d p
9/10, and a p 1/9. It follows that c SL p 4.7896 and ⫺l (c SL) p 1,000e⫺4.7896 p
1
8.3 ! 9 p a . Now suppose p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c), l(c) p 1,000e⫺c, d p 9/10, and a p
1
2/9. It follows that c SL p 5.385 and ⫺l (c SL) p 1,000e⫺5.385 p 4.6 1 4.5 p a . Finally, suppose p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c), l(c) p 1,000e⫺c, d p 9/10, and a p .18636. It
follows that c SL p c* p 5.2277 and ⫺l (c SL) p 1,000e⫺5.2277 p 5.366 p a1 . Note
that this is a borderline case because (c, a) p (5.2277, .18636) is the unique pair
that simultaneously satisﬁes equations (5) and (15).
Implicitly differentiating equation (15) with respect to a, we have
⭸c SL/⭸a p ⫺dl (c SL)/ [(1 ⫺ d)L(c SL) ⫹ dal (c SL)] 1 0 because l (c) ! 0, l (c) 1 0, and
L(c) 1 0. Thus, c SL is increasing in a and decreasing in 1 ⫺ a . Furthermore,
1
⭸c SL/⭸a 1 0 and l (c) ! 0 imply that ⫺l (c SL) is increasing in a. Hence, since a is
decreasing in a, the likelihood that ⫺l (c SL) ! a1 , and therefore that c SL ! c*, is
increasing in 1 ⫺ a and decreasing in a. Conversely, the likelihood that

1
⫺l (c SL) 1 a , and therefore that c SL 1 c*, is decreasing in 1 ⫺ a and increasing
in a.
Implicitly differentiating equation (15) with respect to d, we have
 SL
⭸c SL/⭸d p [L(c
) ⫺ al (c SL)] / [(1 ⫺ d)L(c SL) ⫹ dal (c SL)]. Note that (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL) ⫹
 SL
dal (c SL) 1 0 because L(c) 1 0 and l (c) 1 0. So ⭸c SL/⭸d ⱀ 0 as L(c
) ⫺ al (c SL) ⱀ 0,
 SL
 SL
 SL
 SL
 SL
SL
SL  SL
or as a ⱀ L(c
.
Now
)/l (c )
L(c )/l (c ) p [p (c )l(c ) ⫹ p(c )l (c )] /l (c SL) p
 SL
SL
 SL
SL
SL
p (c )l(c )/l (c ) ⫹ p(c ) 1 p(c ) because p (c) 1 0 and l (c) 1 0. It follows that
 SL
 SL
⭸c SL/⭸d ! 0 if a ! p(c SL) ! L(c
)/l (c SL) or if p(c SL) ! a ! L(c
)/l (c SL) and that
SL
 SL
 SL
SL
SL
⭸c /⭸d 1 0 if a 1 L(c )/l (c ) 1 p(c ). Thus, c is decreasing in d if the injurer is
 SL
)/l (c SL) and c SL is increasing in d if
optimistic or if he is pessimistic and a ! L(c
 SL
 SL
the injurer is pessimistic and a 1 L(c )/l (c ).
Now l (c) ! 0 implies that ⫺l (c SL) is decreasing in d if ⭸c SL/⭸d ! 0 and increasing
1
in d if ⭸c SL/⭸d 1 0. Thus, since a is independent of d, it follows that the likelihood
1
 SL
that ⫺l (c ) ! a , and therefore that c SL ! c*, is increasing in d if the injurer is
 SL
optimistic or if he is pessimistic and a ! L(c
)/l (c SL) and decreasing in d if the
 SL
 SL
injurer is pessimistic and a ! L(c )/l (c ). Conversely, the likelihood that
1
⫺l (c SL) 1 a , and therefore that c SL 1 c*, is decreasing in d if the injurer is optimistic
 SL
or if he is pessimistic and a ! L(c
)/l (c SL) and increasing in d if the injurer is
 SL
 SL
pessimistic and a ! L(c )/l (c ). Q.E.D.

B5. Proof of Proposition 5

Recall that G(c SL) { c SL ⫹ dal(c SL) ⫹ (1 ⫺ d)L(c SL). In the proof of proposition 4,
1
I show that model parameters exist such that ⫺l (c SL) ⰿ a . Thus, to establish that
N
c ≤ c*, it is sufﬁcient to show that model parameters exist such that c* 1
G(c SL). Suppose p(c) p 1/ (1 ⫹ c), l(c) p 1,000e⫺c, d p 99/100, and a p 1/99. It
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follows that c* p 5.2277 and c SL p 2.605836 and that G(c SL) p 2.6058 ⫹
(99/100) (1/99) (1,000e⫺2.6058) ⫹ [1 ⫺ (99/100)] [1/ (1 ⫹ 2.6058)] (1,000e⫺2.6058) p
3.549 ! 5.2277 p c*.
Now, by the envelope theorem, ⭸G(c SL)/⭸d p al(c SL) ⫺ L(c SL) p [a ⫺
SL
p(c )]l(c SL). It follows that ⭸G(c SL)/⭸d ! 0 p ⭸c*/⭸d if a ! p(c SL) and that
⭸G(c SL)/⭸d 1 0 p ⭸c*/⭸d if a 1 p(c SL). Thus, the likelihood that G(c SL) ! c*, and
therefore that c SL ! c*, increases with d if the injurer is optimistic and decreases
with d if the injurer is pessimistic.
Finally, by proposition 4, the likelihood that ⫺l (c SL) ≥ a1 , and therefore that

1
c N p c*, increases with a and decreases with 1 ⫺ a . If ⫺l (c SL) ! a , the likelihood
that c* ≤ G(c SL), and therefore that c N p c*, increases with a and decreases with
1 ⫺ a because, by the envelope theorem, ⭸G/⭸a p dl(c SL) 1 0 . It follows that the

likelihood that the injurer will choose c N p c* increases with a and decreases
with 1 ⫺ a, which implies the likelihood that the injurer will choose c N ! c*
increases with 1 ⫺ a and decreases with a. Q.E.D.
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